In Venezuela, the informal sector has increased its participation in the labor market remarkably. Poverty levels of workers in the informal sector are higher than in the formal sector of the economy. Given the structure of the Venezuelan economy and the global trends, it is very unlikely that the formal sector will be able to absorb the labor force supply at a fast rate. This paper studies the relationship between poverty and informality in Venezuela through the determinants of labor earnings. Estimating an earnings model, that considers the probability of working in the informal sector, it was possible to determine the impact that education, experience, gender, geographic location and economic activities have on informal workers. The result of the estimation implies that male informal workers with more education and experience, urban, and dedicated to transportation, distribution, and mining, have significantly higher earnings per hour than other informal workers do. Results show that the informal sector remunerates experience at a higher rate than formal schooling. The informal sector also has broad gender gaps. Informal entrepreneurs receive earnings that double, on average, those received by informal self-employed workers and more than double those received by the informal employees. As a conclusion, a strategy directed towards the reduction of poverty should have two parallel aims. First, increase formal employment by policies heading towards economic growth and more flexible labor regulation. The second aim should be to increase productivity and wage levels in the informal sector. This paper finds evidence on the importance of education, experience, and capital access for informal earnings. Programs providing specific training for workers should have positive results on informal earnings. On the other hand, the significant differences between the employer and employee's wages can be related to the difficult access to capital, which is a scarce resource in the informal sector. Therefore, programs that encourage micro lending will increase the average productivity of micro-enterprises and the relocation of employees into owners of new informal firms. JEL Classification: I30, J21,J31, J42, O12
I. -Introduction
The urban informal sector has registered significant growth in Latin America during the last two decades. According to the ILO (International Labour Organization), 83% of the new jobs in the region, between 1990 and 1993, were created in the informal sector. The interpretation of this phenomenon depends on the adopted theoretical framework. Some theories are in line with a "dark view" which associates the informal sector with poor, unproductive, and excluded workers. On the other hand, there is a "bright view" which associates the informal sector with productive workers with high levels of business initiative and income above the poverty line. This paper studies the relationship between poverty and informality in Venezuela through the determinants of labor earnings.
In Venezuela, the informal sector has increased its participation on employment, from 32% of total employment in 1978 to 52% in 1999. According to Riutort (1999) , there is a much higher incidence of poverty in the informal sector than in the formal sector. The main causes of the contraction of the formal sector (low employment in oil related activities, lack of sustained growth of non-oil activities, and shrinkage of the public sector), are likely to remain unchanged for a long time.
One of the poverty reduction strategies derived from the traditional labor market's theories, also coincident with the "dark view", is to increase formal employment by all means. Nevertheless, according to theories closer to the "bright view" the informal sector is able to achieve high levels of productivity. Some of the workers in the informal sector are probably in their best option of income and working under an efficient structure.
Additionally, the global trends towards the reduction of firm's size and the increase of subcontracting also have consequences on employment structure. In consequence, trying to reduce informality doesn't seem enough for the reduction of poverty. Likewise, it is necessary to understand the logic behind the informal sector to realize what it takes to improve the life conditions of informal workers. This paper emphasizes the importance of labor earnings as a determinant of poverty levels inside the informal sector as well as the formal sector. The paper focuses on the following questions: -How big is the gap between earnings of formal and informal workers? , -How important is the impact that education and experience have on formal and informal workers? , Is it possible to increase earning levels in the informal sector? , -Are there groups, within the informal sector, that are highly vulnerable to poverty and some that are not? , -How much more would some informal workers receive if they worked in the formal sector of the economy?
The informal sector is defined as all legal activities that do not comply with labor, taxation, and other regulations. However, in practice it is very difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between informal and formal activity in developing countries since there are different levels of compliance towards laws and regulations and firm based census or surveys are rarely available. Hence, an operational definition based on characteristics that are highly correlated with regulation compliance is conventionally used. In this paper the operational definition of the informal sector includes workers of micro-enterprises (four or less workers including the owner), and non-professional self-employed workers (with less than 10 years of schooling). The data used comes from the Venezuelan National Household Survey prepared by OCEI (Central Office for Statistics).
The paper is organized as follows: theoretical views on the causes of the expansion of the informal sector are summarized in section II. Section III, analyzes the informal sector in Venezuela at the aggregate level. Section IV analyzes the situation of informal workers based on their earnings and their characteristics. The determinants of informal and formal earnings are studied in section V estimating an earnings model. Section VI consists of comparisons between two opposite groups inside the informal sector: the "Bright view" type (workers with high wages) and the "Dark view" type (workers in extreme poverty).
Section VII offers some conclusions and public policy recommendations.
II. -Theoretical Views on the Informal Sector: the Dark view and the Bright view
The traditional literature on the informal sector is in line with a "dark view" which associates the informal sector with poor, unproductive, and excluded workers. Meanwhile, part of the informal sector literature of the 1990's shows a "brighter" side, which is the business initiative and income generating capabilities of informal microenterprises. Recent studies show a great heterogeneity in earning levels for informal workers in Latin America 1 . Thus, models adopting different views explain the behavior of different 1 See for example Maloney (1996) and segments within the informal sector. In fact, the usefulness of the dichotomy formalinformal is currently questioned. Maldonado (1995) proposes the following classification of the main theories that explain the expansion of the informal sector in less developed countries (LDC):
• Structural Underemployment: Informality expands in response to contractions of aggregate demand (due to continuous decline in natural resources prices) or an aggregate demand which is stagnant while there is sustained increase of labor supply.
According to this framework, the informal sector has low productivity because is basically disguised unemployment. This idea has been sustained by the International Labor Organization (ILO). Under this view eliminating labor regulations would not necessarily increase formal employment or compliance by microenterprises 2 . On the contrary, the reduction of informality can be achieved through policies that stimulate domestic aggregate demand and the reduction of natural resource dependency.
• Inadequate Institutional Framework: In some countries firm registration and permits are extremely cumbersome and costly procedures, labor regulation is unreachable, and taxation is heavy and complicated. These restrictions in the formal sector limit small entrepreneur's initiatives. Informal employment starts also as a consequence of labor regulations such as the minimum wage, that make workers too expensive and therefore increase unemployment rates in the formal sector. According to this view it is necessary to eliminate some barriers of entry to the formal sector of the economy and to reduce the minimum real wage in order to improve conditions in the labor market 3 .
• Micro-enterprise: This view supposes a change in the unit of analysis. Instead of using the informal worker, it uses the informal firm (even if it is a one-person firm).
Formality levels vary significantly among small firms. Micro-enterprises generally evaluate the costs and benefits of becoming part of the formal sector. The costs consist of taxes, registry and license payments, errand and waiting time, and higher labor costs.
The benefits can be working in safer areas, more access to credit, more access to public and private services, more access to technology and better access to some market segments. On the other hand, an important benefit from being in the formal sector is to avoid non-compliance penalties. From this point of view, micro-enterprises can increase notably their productivity and formalization with better access to technology, capital, and training. Also by increasing its productivity and income the micro-enterprise can be a poverty reduction tool. The OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) and other multilateral organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have adopted this view 4 .
Empirically, these three views complement each other in addition to a fourth view that sees informality as a social exclusion problem. The underemployment view implies a direct relationship between informality and poverty. When inadequate regulations increase formal sector unemployment the informal sector absorbs excess supply at relatively lower wages than the formal sector which does not directly imply that informal workers are poor but that they could be earning more if the regulations were not in place. In fact, the informal sector prevents many workers from being unemployed (receiving no earnings at all in most LDC). Finally the micro-enterprise view shows is more optimistic given that it considers the informal units as heterogeneous ones and not necessarily a cause of poverty but actually as potential economic development cells.
The three views analyzed above also differ in their answers to the fundamental question: Do workers actually choose to be in the informal sector because is their best option or are they constrained to it by formal unemployment? Only the view that considers the informal sector as a group of micro-enterprises implies that informality is in fact a rational choice.
The public policy implications of each one of these theoretical views are different in aim and scope. According to the theory of structural underemployment it is necessary to increase the size of the formal sector by all means, even through public sector employment.
The inadequate regulation framework indicates that tax and labor legislation costs should be reduced as well as the legal procedures for starting a firm. Finally, the micro-enterprise view suggests that informal productivity can be encouraged trough micro-lending, training, cooperative organization, and technological transfers.
III. -The Informal Sector in Venezuela
In this section the Venezuelan informal sector is characterized as a whole. This section also describes the relationship between the Venezuelan informal sector and some macroeconomic variables. Special attention is paid to the evolution of the informal sector's size, average level of earnings, and aggregate poverty indicators. Márquez and Portela (1991) note the heterogeneity of the informal sector in Venezuela concluding that the differences in earnings among informal workers are very significant. They found that, in general, the Venezuelan informal sector has increased its participation during economic recessions between the 1970´s and the 1980´s, acting like a cushion for some workers. It is important to emphasize that the expansion of the informal sector during recessions occurred both at times of low rates of unemployment and high rates of unemployment. Márquez and Portela (1991) indicate that there is a significant gap between informal and formal earnings which increases during recessions and decreases during economic expansions. Thus, the larger negative impact of economic adjustment is borne by the informal sector. Cartaya (1991) studied the relationship between poverty and informality in Venezuela, linking informal workers to the total income of their households. The most outstanding result is that a significant portion of household income comes from the informal sector, both for poor and non-poor households. Another result of Cartaya (1991) is that workers in poor household are for the most part self-employed and employees in the informal sector, but a significant percentage are salaried formal employees. Nevertheless, the author finds an important relationship between poverty intensity and informality, given that the families in extreme poverty registered the greatest part of their income coming from the informal sector.
Results presented by Riutort (1999) reveal that the incidence of poverty is higher, on average, in the informal sector than in the formal sector between 1975 and 1997.
Informal workers have a large probability of being in extreme poverty, specially if they live in rural areas. Table 1 shows the size of the informal sector in some countries in Latin America, in the 1980´s and 1990´s. The countries with the highest informality levels during the 1990´s are Peru, Ecuador, Honduras, and Mexico, with more than 60% of the labor force working in the informal sector. On the other hand, Venezuela and Bolivia show medium levels of informality when compared with the region. Argentina, Costa Rica and Venezuela were the only countries that had an increase on informality levels during the 1990´s. The percentage of informal workers in the region has declined slightly, on average, although poverty levels remain high for the informal sector. Annex 7 shows the percentage of poor people in the formal and informal sector for each country, as an average during the 1990´s. An average of all the countries shows that poverty is more common in the informal sector (43%) than in the formal sector (15%). In Venezuela the percentage of informal poor people is very close to the average of the region and four times higher than the percentage of formal poor people. Honduras and El Salvador register higher poverty levels than those of Venezuela.
-The informal sector in Venezuela as part of a Latin American Phenomenon
On the other hand Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile show relatively low informal poverty levels. During the last decade, the percentage of informal workers has increased, but the ratio of informal generated income over total labor income has decreased. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the informality rate (percentage of workers employed in the informal sector) for every year between 1983 and 1999. The most significant increases of this rate occurred between 1988 and 1990 and between 1993 and 1994 , both periods of economic crisis. The informality rate is more elastic upward than downward, which could be due to heavy barriers of entry into the formal sector. For some individuals, once they start working in the informal sector it is difficult to move back into the formal sector. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows the size of the informal sector not only as the percentage of workers employed by it, but also as the percentage of the GDP that the income generated in this sector represents. The percentage of the GDP represented by the informal labor income is significantly smaller than the percentage of informal workers, and smaller than the percentage of GDP represented by formal labor income. It is also important to notice that increase rate on informal earnings is lower than the increase rate on the number of workers in the sector. 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Year Informality Rate As a consequence of low earnings the informal sector presents higher poverty levels than the formal sector. Riutort (1999) . Figure 4 shows indexes for non-oil GDP (a proxy for productive activities that generate employment domestically), informality and unemployment between 1983 and 1999. Cyclical GDP fluctuations seem to have an effect on informality in Venezuela, as product contractions coincide with increases on informality and product expansions coincide with small contractions of informality. Observing these series, it is possible to conclude that informality has both a cyclical and a structural component in Venezuela.
-Economic Cycle and Informality in Venezuela
Unemployment is more volatile and responsive to non-oil GDP cycles than informality. Betancourt, Freije, Márquez (1995) analyze the labor regulatory framework in Venezuela and its consequences. They conclude that in order to create more formal employment and higher investment in human capital the regulatory framework should be simplified. 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Non Oil Sector GDP Informality Unemployment Betancourt, Freije and Márquez (1995) , Norcini (1997) , Venezuela's Labor Law and author's calculations. * Applies only for workers with more than 5 years in the firm, according to current regulation (since 1997). ** According to regulation a minimum of 15 days of salary in case the firm earns profits. *** Workers receiving up to two minimum wages in firms with more than 50 workers qualify for this benefit. To estimate the incidence of this benefit over total labor cost I used the proportion of workers receiving this wage level and the proportion of firms of this size. **** Based on the estimations of the average rate of fertility of women in the labor force.
The Cost of Labor Regulation and Informality Rates

IV. -Informal Workers in Venezuela
This section describes the characteristics and income of informal workers in Venezuela, comparing their education level, gender composition, experience, geographic location, and economic activities, with those of formal workers. Even though informal workers show, on average, some characteristics that may limit their earnings, they are a very heterogeneous group with clear specialization patterns that probably obey relative advantages or opportunities.
-Probability of Working in the Informal Sector
One of the most important questions in the informal sector literature is why some workers choose or end up in the informal sector. In order to address this issue and to be able to correct for sample selectivity in further estimations, I estimate a logistic probability model of the probability of being in the informal sector in Venezuela. The model is described in detail on Appendix 1. The probability, for each individual of the sample, of working in the formal or informal sector is a function of the years of schooling, gender, age, number of individuals in the labor force within the household, household size, and area (urban or rural) 6 .
According to some studies, such as Portes, Castells and Benton (1989) , there is a high probability of being in the informal sector for women, because of more flexibility in the working hours and the possibility of combining working activities with domestic chores. This is also the case for individuals in rural areas who live in large households with more than one person working (as a strategy of income diversification) 7 . Likewise, individuals with less education choose, or sometimes are forced, to enter the informal sector.
Estimation results, using maximum likelihood, are shown in Table 4 (for 1990) and Table 5 (for 1997). The percentage of workers allocated to the actual sector by the probability model is over 68% in both cases. All variables included are significant at less than 1%. Workers with higher probability of being in the informal sector (lower probability of being in the formal sector) are those with less education, women, and those living in rural areas. Contrary to what was expected, belonging to a numerous household does not increase the probability of being employed in the informal sector. Contradictory results are obtained for the variables age and number of workers within the household, for the years 1990 and 1997. 6 Urban areas are defined as those with 2.500 people or more. 7 According to the informal sector literature there are other variables related to the probability of being in the informal sector. However, the number of variables is restricted by the information included in the database and the econometric requirements for the identification of the estimation model in the remuneration function in section V. Data processing by CISOR-IIES based on the Household Surveys (OCEI). Estimations made by the author using a logistic probability model. Data processing by CISOR-IIES based on the Household Surveys (OCEI). Estimations made by the author using a logistic probability model.
-Informal Workers versus Formal Workers in Venezuela
-General Characteristics of Informal and Formal Workers
Tables 6 and 7 contain averages for some variables describing formal and informal workers in 1990 and 1997, respectively. The mean differences between workers of each sector are all statistically significant except for the weekly working hours in the year 1997.
Informal workers have, on average, lower levels of education with a gap of four years of schooling less than formal workers. This characteristic is consistent with the fact that for individuals with lower levels of education there is a higher probability of being employed in the informal sector. To some extent this could be due to the relatively lower remuneration that the informal sector gives to education (see section V). However, the lower levels of formal education in the informal sector are an indicator of underemployment and limit the capacity of accumulating human capital. Hence, productivity and earnings are limited for an important group of informal workers.
Another important element that contributes to human capital is the experience acquired in a specific activity. The data used does not have specific information about the experience acquired in the different activities. However, I use "potential experience" as a proxy variable. This potential experience is defined as the number of years that the individual has been able to work and has not dedicated to formal schooling 8 . The informal sector includes workers with much more potential experience than the formal sector (6 more years on average in 1997) which may suggests that experience in the informal sector is an important training mechanism. However, for a given experience level in the informal sector earnings could be enhanced, as found in section V, with more education.
The informal sector in Venezuela is intertwined with the process of urbanization and most workers, formal and informal, live in urban areas. Nevertheless, in 1997 the percentage of formal urban workers was higher, 89%, than the percentage of informal urban workers, 76%.
Between the years 1990 and 1997 there has been an increase in the number of women working in both sectors, which is consistent with the trend of women's participation in the labor force in Venezuela 9
. In contrast with the prevailing gender composition in other countries in Latin America, the informal sector in Venezuela has a higher percentage of male workers than the formal sector 10 . However, female workers present higher probability of being in the informal sector, according to the former section, once education is taking into account. There is an asymmetry in women's labor force participation in Venezuela. Women with high levels of education are most likely to have professional, administrative, public sector or academic formal jobs. On the other hand, women with low levels of education register high participation rates in the informal sector.
The average monthly earnings gap between the formal and informal sector has increased between 1990 and 1997. In 1997 the average monthly labor income in the formal sector was 62% higher than the average monthly income in the informal sector. These results are closely related with poverty and real income indicators described in section III.
In section V this gap in the average monthly wages will be explained using labor income determinants for each sector. 
-Formal and Informal Sector Hierarchies in Venezuela
A comparative analysis between the average earnings and education of formal and informal workers in Venezuela confirms the idea of a poor and unproductive informal sector. However, if each worker is classified according to her/his position inside the firm this conclusion is curbed. The position inside the firm is significantly related to property rights and access to capital, especially in small firms and microenterprises. There are three categories in the Venezuelan National Household Survey, according to position within the firm: employer (owner), self-employed (owner) and employee (not owner)
11
. Figure 5 shows the structural differences related to firm ownership. In the formal sector there is a majority of employees while in the informal sector there is a majority of self-employed.
The number of employers is relatively small in the formal sector yet in the informal sector they represent about 11%.
because of the disintegration of microenterprises into self-employed workers due to the learning curve within the informal sector Source: Data processing by CISOR-IIES based on Household Surveys (OCEI) 13 There is empirical evidence of a learning phase during which workers remain as apprentices (with or without payment) of a more experienced worker, until they accumulate enough experience and capital to become self-employed. Likewise, most of the self-employed will become employers when they grow enough to hire workers. See Maloney (1999) , Orlando y Pollack (2000) . 14 This structure is the same found for other Latin American countries, see Orlando and Pollack (2000) Formal Sector 2,9%
84,1%
13,0%
Informal Sector 11,0% 23,7%
65,3%
Employer Employee Self-Employed 
4.2.3-Formal and Informal Economic Activities
Formal and informal workers concentrate in different economic activities (Tables 8   and 9) Informal Employer 58%
Formal Self-Employed 54% Formal Employee 40%
Informal Self-Employed 25%
Informal Employee 22%
that registers the highest earnings per worker is the mining industry (oil, iron and other minerals). Unfortunately, the mining sector has little repercussion over aggregate labor income given that it only employs about 1% of total workers and less than 0.5% of informal workers. Source: Data processing by CISOR-IIES based on the Household Surveys (OCEI).
-Informal Workers Earnings
Informal workers are surprisingly heterogeneous and their earnings change acoording to their education, age, gender and geographic location. Annexes 1, 2 and 3 show the average level of earnings as well as its dispersion for categories built on the previous variables.
Most informal workers have an education level equivalent to primary school (or less). In 1990 and 1997 an informal worker with college studies (3% of the informal workers) had earnings that were three and a half times higher than those of an informal worker who did not complete primary school. The standard deviation of labor income increases within groups with high levels of education (see Annex 1).
About half of informal workers are between 21 and 40 years old (see Annex 2).
Approximately 9% of informal workers are older than 61 years old and less than 15% are younger than 20 years old. This age composition is typical of the Venezuelan labor force and has remained stable between 1990 and 1997. In 1990 workers within the 41 and 50 years old group had the highest earnings, while in 1997 it was the group between 51 and 60 years old, most of them belonging to the same cohort.
Differences of labor income in terms of gender are higher in the informal sector than in the formal sector
15
. Male informal workers receive, on average, an income that is 70% higher than the one received by female informal workers. This important gap is consequence of the different levels of education and experience between male and female informal workers, as well as discrimination and a lower access to capital for female informal workers (only few women are employers in the informal sector). The earnings gap in the formal sector is about 20% and female formal workers have the same or more education than their male counterparts.
Urban informal workers have, on average, higher incomes than average rural informal workers do. However, the rural -urban gap becomes smaller in 1997, changing from 46% to 28% of rural average income. In Venezuela the differences of income between rural and urban areas are related to deep regional disparities. Education and experience should have a positive impact over income per-hour because they increase productivity or because they are used as "signals" of qualities such as motivation and responsibility. Education and experience are also included in a squared form because their relation with productivity and labor income could be non-linear with increasing returns or decreasing returns. Schooling is used in our estimation as a proxy variable for education and "potential experience" (defined in section IV) is used as a proxy variable for experience. The estimated coefficients represent semi-elasticities that measure the impact that an extra school year and experience year has on labor income per hour.
18
It was not possible to include age in the estimation because it is highly correlated with the proxy of potential experience and it wouldn't supply any relevant information. The next personal characteristic included is gender. According to the literature on gender labor income gap, this might be the result of wage discrimination, the feminization or masculinization of some occupations, or the product of preferences of workwomen or workmen.
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Gender is a dichotomic dummy variable that becomes zero for females and one for males. The estimated coefficient measures the increase in labor income per hour only as the result of being a man. It was not possible to include marital status in the estimation because it is not available in the database used.
Additional dummy variables are included to control for urban-regional differences and economic activity. The urban-rural dummy becomes zero if the worker lives in a rural 17 The gap between formal and informal workers estimated by this method is an approximation to the extra amount of labor income that a formal worker receives when compared to an informal worker with the same characteristics. In other words, it is the extra amount of income received just for being in the formal sector. 18 Training or capacitation is an important factor that is not included in the Household Survey by sample. 19 See Orlando and Zugiña (2000) .
area and one if the worker lives in an urban area. On the other hand, the economic activity dummy becomes zero if the individual doesn't work in that specific sector and one if it does.
Finally, a formal-informal dummy variable is included and it becomes zero if the individual is in the informal sector and one if he is in the formal sector. The estimated coefficient measures the gap between the two sectors given that the workers are equivalent in the rest of the variables included. The database used doesn't include important variables mentioned in the literature about work remuneration, related to the labor market structure in which the individual works (unionization and occupation categories). Also the variable that shows the worker's position in the firm is excluded because of the number of missing observations.
All workers were included in the first estimation (section 5.1) to be able to obtain an estimation of the gap between the informal and formal sector in the economy (using the formal dummy variable). This estimation was calculated once it was controlled for the other labor income determinants such as education, age, gender and geographic location. In a segmented labor market, with different remuneration structures in the informal and formal sector, this estimation can be improved by making separate estimations for each group 20 The following sections (5.2 and 5.3) show the results of the separate estimations for the informal and formal sector, using an adjustment for the fact that workers may choose to be in one sector or the other according to a given probability (selectivity correction). For the selectivity correction the logistic probability model estimated in section 3 is used (λ Mills´ inverse coefficient is calculated for each observation according to Appendix 2 ). Tables 10 and 11 show the results on the least squares estimation obtained including all workers, using the databases of 1990 and 1997. In 1990, 33% (R 2 ) of labor income variation is explained by the variables included in the model. In 1997, the model explains 20 There is evidence about segmentation between the formal and informal labor market in Venezuela (Márquez, 1991) . I did not apply a formal test for segmentation as the one described in Magnac (1991) . However, the comparison of each sector's coefficient and the econometric results for the separate samples are consistent with the existence of segmented markets.
Earnings Model: Joint Estimation
18% of all labor income variation.
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All variables are individually significant at 1% (t test) and the regression is globally significant (F test). The coefficient signs were the ones expected. The heteroscedasticity hypothesis can be rejected according to the Goldfeld and Quandt tests at less than 5%.
Working in the formal sector produces a net increase of labor income of 13% in 1990 and 21% in 1997, for workers with the same level of education, experience, gender, geographic location and economic activity. These results confirm the existence of a significant and increasing income gap between the informal and formal sector. This net gap is also an indicator of segmentation between both sectors as a result of the entry barriers in the formal sector. These differences can also be due to some variables related to labor marginal product in each sector, such as level of capital, technological progress and access to different markets.
According to the aggregate estimation, an extra school year increases labor income in more than 5% in 1990 and almost 3% in 1997, which means that there is a relative low remuneration to education 21 Different functional specifications were estimated; the one with the highest R 2 is shown. The coefficients don't change in a significant way when changing the specifications, which is a positive sign of their robustness. The R 2 in 1997 is low even when considering that for cross section estimations it is normal to obtain a R 2 lower than 0.5. The low explicative power of the model can be a consequence of the missing variables in the database, as mentioned before. 22 To calculate the impact of an extra school year on labor income, the coefficient of School Years Approved and the one for School Years squared were included (See Methodological Appendix 2). 
-Earnings Model Segmented Estimation: Workers in the Formal Sector.
Tables 12 and 13 show the results on the estimation of labor remuneration for formal workers. Two stage least squares are used to incorporate a selectivity correction (see methodological Appendix 1 and 2). The variable corresponding to the selectivity correction (λ or Mill's inverse ratio) is significant at 1%, which implies that the probability of finding a job in each sector is correlated with earnings determinants. The model explains 33% of variation in labor income for 1990 and 14% in 1997 (R 2 ), and is also globally significant.
All variables included are individually significant and the coefficients have the signs that were expected.
It is important to underline the impact that education has on labor income in the formal sector. An extra year of education increases formal remuneration in 12% for 1990
and in 27% for 1997. In 1990 education has increasing marginal returns given that the coefficient of school years squared is positive. On the other hand, in 1997 education has decreasing marginal returns. Experience has an impact on remuneration similar to the one for the whole sample (3% and 2%). In the formal sector, working in urban areas represents a remuneration increase of 37% (1997) while working in agriculture represents a decrease in remuneration of 27%. Mining, intermediate activities, and construction represent high income, whereas public sector and retail commerce represent low remuneration. 
-Earnings Model Segmented Estimation: Workers in the Informal Sector
Results of the labor remuneration estimation including informal workers only are shown in tables 14 and 15. The estimation uses two-stage least squares to incorporate a correction for selectivity (see methodological Appendix 1 and 2). The variable corresponding to the selectivity correction (λ or Mill's inverse coefficient) is significant at 1%. All variables included are individually significant and the coefficients have the signs that were expected.
This model explains less variation in earnings than the one for formal workers (R 2 is 25% in 1990 and 13% in 1997) . This result suggests that some variables specific for informal labor income (access to credit, position in the firm, size of the microenterprise, etc.), excluded because of lack of data, might have an important role in the Venezuelan informal sector.
One of the most interesting results is the impact of education on informal earnings.
Informal earnings increase in 5% (1990) and 9% (1997) 
-Comparison between Earning Determinants in the Formal and Informal Sector
Tables 16 and 17 summarize the coefficients of the determinant variables of labor income for the informal and formal sector in 1990 and 1997, showing important differences. Positive signs in the Difference column indicate that the variable has a higher positive impact on earnings or a lower negative impact in the formal sector than in the informal sector. Education has a positive effect on informal labor incomes; yet, the formal sector remunerates almost three times more, on average, each additional year of education.
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On the other hand, experience has a higher positive impact in the informal sector than in the formal sector, due to the close relation between experience and training present in informal activities that require manual skills. 23 The reduction on the rate of return to education in Venezuela can be partly due to the expansion of the informal sector. For estimations of rate of return of education in Venezuela, for several periods, see Guevara (1999) .
To be a woman in the formal sector is less disadvantageous, given an equivalent level of education and experience than a man, possibly because of the influence of equal opportunity labor regulation and trade unions. In addition to this, women in the formal sector have higher levels of education, which means a more advantageous position when negotiating their wages. Most women in the informal sector are employees (including unpaid family workers) or self-employed, which affects their labor income in a negative way.
Living in urban areas brings more advantages to formal workers even though urban informal workers have higher incomes than rural informal workers do. On the other hand, working in agriculture has a higher negative impact in the formal sector. In 1990, retail commerce had a higher negative impact in the informal sector. Working on the intermediate sector (including wholesale commerce and transportation) has a higher positive impact on informal labor income than in formal labor income. According to these results it is possible to achieve improvements in labor income levels through worker's mobility among economic activities and regions. 
VI. -The Dark view and the Bright view of the Informal Sector in Venezuela.
In former sections we studied the characteristics of the informal sector as a whole and showed it heterogeneity. In general, informal workers with more education, male, urban, and employers have higher earnings and lower probability of being poor than other informal workers. Likewise, informal workers in intermediation and mining have relatively high earnings compared to informal workers in agriculture, retail commerce or construction. In this section I focus on two groups of informal workers that show clear characteristics of opposite theoretical views on the informal sector: the dark view (informal workers are poor) and the bright view (informal workers are not necessarily poor) (see section II).
To study these opposite groups we created two sub-samples within the informal workers segment, according to their labor income. The group representing the dark view includes workers with an income level lower or equal to the extreme poverty line for the respective year
24
. We can expect that these workers remain in the informal sector only for subsistence reasons and do not have job opportunities in the formal sector. On the other hand, the group representing the bright view includes informal workers with a labor income higher than the average labor income in the formal sector
25
. These workers can be seen as highly productive micro-entrepreneurs (or micro-enterprise employees) who choose to be in the informal sector because is better for them. Tables 18 and 19 . It is important to mention that the informal sector has seen an increase in both "Dark view" and "Bright view" workers.
The "Dark view" group has, in 1997, an average level of education of five years, which is much lower than the education level of the "Bright view" group. Workers of the "Dark view" were not able to finish primary school and therefore they are more vulnerable to poverty. Informal "bright" workers have a higher potential experience and more than 85% of them work in urban areas. Bright informal workers have a low participation rate in agriculture in contrast to the one third of the "Dark view" group working in this sector. A privileged group that includes many "Bright view" workers carries out mining informal activities. Bright view workers also have a higher participation rate in intermediation sectors (wholesale, transportation and communication).
In order to establish a relationship between the theoretical views of the informal sector and the representative workers of each of our sub-samples it is necessary to determine if they are in the informal sector because they actually chose to or because they 24 The extreme poverty line is the value, in Bolivars, of a normative basket of food for the respective year (See Riutort, 1999) . 25 Using the income distribution of formal workers, the 50.000 Bs line was chosen for 1990 and the 500.000 Bs line was chosen for 1997 as the minimal income of "bright view" informal workers. 26 Márquez and Portela (1991) classified informal units, in Venezuela, into "poor", "medium" and "efficient" using as a criteria the permanence over time and the type of activity in which the individual works (economic sectors). The authors concluded that 19% of units were efficient (manufacture and transportation), and that 64% are poor (retail commerce, domestic service and other services).
don't have access to the formal sector. The hypothesis is that workers of the "Bright view"
are in the informal sector because they chose so and that workers of the "Dark view" are forced to work in the informal sector as their only alternative for survival. The database used does not contain the type of information to be able to answer this question. However, in this section we will try to answer a similar question: Would the typical worker of each group be willing to switch to the formal sector? In order to address this issue the only available indicator in the data set is labor income. Thus, I use a simulation of the level of income that the average informal worker of each "view" would earn in the formal sector given his/her characteristics.
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The simulation consists first in taking the average value for each determinant of earnings for the "dark view" and "bright view" informal groups. Then the corresponding level of formal labor income is calculated using the estimated formal coefficients from section 5.2 . The procedure is described in Annex 6(a) to 6(d) for 1990 and 1997. The value of λ, or Mill's coefficient, was previously estimated for each sub-group.
As a result, in 1990 an informal worker of the "Dark view" would receive 21% more income if he/she worked in the formal sector given his/her average education, experience, gender and economic sector (see table 18 ). In 1997 the same worker would receive 26% more income in the formal sector. These results indicate the existence of significant entry barriers into the formal sector. This evidence corresponds with the hypothesis about the "dark view" of the informal sector: these workers are somehow forced to stay informal. On the other hand, the "bright" informal workers would earn less in the formal sector, given their average characteristics (2% of their labor income less in 1990 and 0.3% in 1997). The monetary advantage of the "bright" workers in the informal sector is very small but significant, showing that these workers may stay in the informal sector for a combination of reasons including higher income, independence and more flexibility. 
VII. -Conclusions
The informal sector has expanded significantly in the last decade in Venezuela, especially during economic contractions. However, GDP stagnation is not the only explanation of the existence of high levels of informality. The Venezuelan economy has structural conditions and high labor costs associated to regulation that lead to low formal employment. In addition, trends in global markets require downsizing large corporations (to reduce costs and increase firm's geographical mobility) with the consequent emergence of microenterprises as an employment alternative. On average, the informal sector in Venezuela has lower earnings and a higher poverty incidence than the formal sector.
Informal labor income has deteriorated in a significant way during the last decade.
However, informal workers show significant heterogeneity reflected on the informal earnings scale according to the position inside the firm. Workers who are owners of a microenterprise (informal entrepreneurs) receive an income that is, on average, twice as much as that of self-employed informal workers, and twice and a half higher than that of informal employees.
The results of estimating a labor income model imply that informal workers with more experience and education, male, urban, and working in intermediation (wholesale commerce and transportation) and mining, receive significantly higher income per hour than the rest. In the informal sector experience is highly remunerated compared to the formal sector. On the other hand, education is less remunerated in the informal sector and the gender gap is wider.
According to simulation results, there are representative workers of the dark view and the bright view of the informal sector in Venezuela, although the bright view is poorly represented. Given their characteristics, workers belonging to high-income groups in the informal sector (bright view) receive slightly higher earnings than they would receive in the formal sector. On the contrary, informal workers in extreme poverty (dark view) receive lower earnings than their corresponding wage in the formal sector. Thus, for the majority of informal workers in Venezuela working in the informal sector is a consequence of significant entry barriers in the formal sector.
The detailed examination of earnings and its determinants in both the formal and informal sector in Venezuela leads to the following recommendations:
-A strategy towards poverty reduction in labor markets should have two parallel aims:
increasing formal employment and increasing worker's productivity and earnings within the informal sector. The reduction of informality in Venezuela is highly related to sustained economic growth and more flexible labor regulations. However, given that the most important economic activities in Venezuela are intensive in capital and technology, the elimination of the informal sector is not a realistic objective;
-Education plays an important roll, both in the informal and formal sector, and is also an important factor to increase the probability of working in the formal sector. Education, along with experience, increases informal earnings in a significant way. According to this, the informal sector remunerates, in an important way, specific abilities and skills.
Thus, training programs could have an important impact on informal earnings;
-The important differences between employee and employer labor income can be related to capital access, which is the scarcest resource in the informal sector. Micro-lending programs could have a positive impact on productivity and informal labor income either by an increase in the average microenterprise productivity and/or by a mobilization of employees and self-employed into owners of a microenterprise;
-Differences in labor income across economic activities and geographic location, inside the informal sector, indicate that workers can benefit from higher mobility;
-Considering the heterogeneity of the Venezuelan informal sector, poverty alleviation programs should focus on specific problems for groups in disadvantage, such as informal employees and non-wage workers, rural workers, women, and workers with little experience; -As other authors have mentioned, the formal-informal dichotomy has limited usefulness for studying the productivity of informal units and for designing public policy. It is important in Venezuela to implement microenterprise surveys through the government statistics agency. 
Probability of being employed in the Informal Sector
To estimate the probability of being employed in the informal sector we used a logistic model of probabilities. We started with a function representing the individual's utility of being working in the informal or formal sector: 
where i= worker; j= sector (1= formal sector, 2= informal sector) ; U i j , = utility level of the i individual in sector j; Z i = set of particular characteristics that determines the utility level (wage, work schedule, flexibility, place of work, safety) in each sector; γ j = coefficients set; e i j , = error term. The error's expected value is zero. 
